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We apply the techniques introduced in [Kraus et. al., Phys. Rev. Lett., 95, 080501, 2005] to prove
security of quantum key distribution (QKD) schemes using two-way classical post-processing as well
as QKD schemes based on weak coherent pulses instead of single-photon pulses. As a result, we
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I. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental problem in cryptography is to enable
two distant parties, traditionally called Alice and Bob, to
communicate in absolute privacy, even in presence of an
eavesdropper, Eve. It is a well known fact that a secret
key, i.e., a randomly chosen bit string held by both Alice
and Bob, but unknown to Eve, is sufficient to perform
this task (one-time pad encryption). Thus, the problem
of secret communication reduces to the problem of dis-
tributing a secret key.
Classical key distribution protocols are typically based
on unproven computational assumptions, e.g., that the
task of decomposing a large number into its prime fac-
tors is intractable. In contrast to that, the security of
quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols merely relies
on the laws of physics, or, more specifically, quantum
mechanics. This ultimate security is certainly one of the
main reasons why so much theoretical and experimental
effort is undertaken towards the implementation of secure
QKD protocols [1, 2].
Typically [32], in the first step of a QKD protocol, Al-
ice chooses a random bit string and encodes each bit into
the state of a quantum system, which she then sends to
Bob (using a quantum channel). Bob applies a certain
measurement on the received quantum system to decode
the bit value. In a second step, called sifting, Alice and
Bob publicly exchange some information about the en-
coding and decoding of each of the bits which allows them
to discard bit pairs which are not (or only weakly) cor-
related.
After this sifting process, Alice and Bob hold a pair
of classical correlated bitstrings, in the following called
raw key pair. Alice and Bob can determine the quality
of the raw key pair by comparing the values of some ran-
domly chosen bit pairs (using an authenticated classical
communication channel). This so-called parameter esti-
mation gives an estimate for the quantum bit error rate
(QBER), i.e., the ratio of positions for which the values
of the bits held by Alice and Bob do not coincide. A
fundamental principle of QKD is that this error rate also
imposes a bound on the amount of information an adver-
sary can have on the raw key: The smaller the QBER,
the more secret key bits can be extracted from the raw
key. If the QBER is above a certain threshold, then no
secret key can be generated at all, and Alice and Bob
have to abort the protocol [33].
The purpose of the remaining part of the protocol,
called classical post-processing, is to transform the raw
key pair into a pair of identical and secret keys. In this ar-
ticle, we consider classical post-processing which consists
of the following three subprotocols: (i) local randomiza-
tion (also called pre-processing), where Alice randomly
flips each of her bits with some given probability q, (ii) er-
ror correction, where Alice and Bob equalize their strings,
and (iii) privacy amplification, where Alice and Bob ap-
ply some compression function to their bitstring with the
aim to reduce Eve’s information on the outcome. Steps
(i)–(iii) described above only require (classical) one-way
communication from Alice to Bob. However, in practical
implementations, the error correction is sometimes done
with two-way protocols (e.g., the cascade protocol [5]).
In [6, 7], an information-theoretic technique to analyze
QKD protocols of the type described above has been pre-
sented. In contrast to most previously known methods
(e.g., [8]), the technique does not require a transforma-
tion of the key distillation protocol into an entanglement
purification scheme, which makes it very general. It has
been applied to prove the security of various schemes such
as the BB84, the six-state, the B92, and the SARG pro-
tocol [9, 10, 11, 12] (see [6, 7] for an analysis of the first
three protocols and [13] for an analysis of the latter). In
particular, it has been shown that the local randomiza-
tion, i.e., step (i) described above, increases the bounds
on the maximum tolerated QBER by roughly 10–15 %.
In this paper, we extend the technique of [6, 7] (Sec-
tion II) and apply it to two classes of QKD protocols
which have not been covered in [6, 7]. The first (Sec-
tion III) is the class of so-called two-way protocols. These
use an additional subprotocol, called advantage distilla-
tion, which is invoked between the parameter estimation
and the classical post-processing step described above.
In contrast to the classical post-processing considered in
2[6, 7], advantage distillation uses two-way communica-
tion between Alice and Bob. Second, we study protocols
which use weak coherent pulses instead of single-photon
pulses (Section IV). For both scenarios, we show that
local randomization increases the secret-key rates.
II. INFORMATION-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF
QKD SCHEMES
In this section we first review the results presented
in [6, 7] and then show then show how they can be
generalized. Throughout this paper we use subscripts to
indicate the subsystems on which a state is defined. Alice
and Bob’s quantum systems are labelled by A and B,
respectively. Similarly, the classical values obtained by
measuring their quantum systems are denoted by X and
Y , respectively. Typically, we write ρAB, or ρn, to denote
the state of all the qubits held by Alice and Bob, whereas
σAB is a two-qubit state. We will often consider two-
qubit Bell-diagonal states, i.e., states that are diagonal in
the Bell basis, |Φij〉 = (|0, 0+i〉+(−1)j|1, 1+i〉)/
√
2. P|Φ〉
denotes the projector onto the state |Φ〉. Furthermore,
we denote by h(x) = −x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x) the
binary entropy function.
A. Review of the technique
The information-theoretic technique proposed in [6, 7]
directly applies to a general class of quantum key dis-
tribution protocols using one-way classical communica-
tion. However, it is required that the protocol can be
represented as a so-called entanglement-based scheme, as
described below.
Generally, a QKD protocol uses a set of so-called en-
coding bases. We consider the special case where each
basis j is defined by two states |φ0j〉 and |φ1j 〉, which are
used to encode the bit values 0 and 1, respectively. In a
prepare-and-measure scheme, Alice repeatedly chooses at
random a bit i and a basis j, prepares the state |φij〉, and
sends the state to Bob. Bob then measures the state in a
randomly chosen basis k. This measuring process can be
seen as some filtering operation Bk = |0〉〈φ⊥1,k|+|1〉〈φ⊥0,k|,
where |φ⊥i,k〉 is some state orthogonal to |φik〉, followed by
a measurement in the computational basis.
In an entanglement-based view, the above can equiv-
alently be described as follows: Alice prepares the two-
qubit states Aj |Φ00〉, where |Φ00〉 denotes the Bell state
1/
√
2(|0, 0〉+ |1, 1〉) and Aj is an encoding operator (for
details see [6]) such that 〈i|Aj |Φ00〉 = |φij〉. She then
sends the second qubit to Bob and prepares Bob’s system
at a distance by measuring her system in the computa-
tional basis. Bob’s measurement is described in the same
way as in the prepare-and-measure scheme.
Note that, in an experimental realization of a QKD
protocol, one might prefer to implement a prepare-and-
measure scheme. However, when analyzing the security
of a protocol, it is usually more convenient to consider
its entanglement-based version.
As an illustration, consider the BB84 protocol, which
uses the z-basis and the x-basis are used for the encoding.
Using the above notation, we have |φi0〉 = |iz〉 and |φi1〉 =
|ix〉, for i = 0, 1. Hence, the operators applied by Alice
are A0 = 1l and A1 = H , where H denotes the Hadamard
transformation. Because the bases are orthonormal, the
same operators describe Bob’s measurement as well.
For the following, we assume that Alice and Bob apply
a randomly chosen permutation to rearrange the order of
their qubit pairs, in the following denoted by PS , and,
additionally, apply to each of the qubit pairs at random
either the identity or the operation σx ⊗ σx. (Note that
the symmetrization operations commute with the mea-
surement and can therefore be applied to the classical bit
strings). Then, as shown in [6], the state ρAB describing
the N qubit pairs shared by Alice and Bob can generally
(after the most general attack by Eve, a so-called coher-
ent attack) be considered to be of a simple form, namely
ρAB =
∑
n1,...,n4
λn1,n2,n3,n4PS(P⊗n1|Φ00〉⊗P
⊗n2
|Φ01〉⊗P
⊗n3
|Φ10〉⊗P
⊗n4
|Φ11〉) .
(1)
The sum runs over all nonnegative n1, . . . , n4 such that
n1 + n2 + n3 + n4 = N . The set of possible values of the
coefficients λn1,n2,n3,n4 depends on the specific protocol
and the parameters estimated by Alice and Bob (e.g., the
QBER of the raw key). Furthermore, one can assume
without loss of generality that Eve has a purification of
this state, i.e., the situation is fully described by a pure
state |Ψ〉ABE such that ρAB = trE(P|Ψ〉ABE ). (However,
as we shall see, dropping this assumption might lead to
better estimates of the key rate.) After this distribution
of quantum information Alice and Bob measure their sys-
tems. Thus they are left with classical bit-strings.
Consider now any situation where Alice and Bob have
a classical pair of raw keysXn and Y n consisting of n bits
whereas Eve controls a quantum system E. The secret-
key rate, i.e., the rate at which secret key bits can be
generated per bit of the raw key, for any one-way protocol
(with communication from Alice to Bob), is given by
r = lim
ε→0
lim
n→∞
1
n
sup
Un←Xn
Sε2(U
nEn)−Sε0(En)−Hε0(Un|Y n) .
(2)
Here, Sεα, H
ε
α denote the smooth Re´nyi entropies (also
called min-entropy if α = ∞ and max-entropy if α =
0) [21]. Moreover, the supremum runs over all classical
values Un that can be computed from (the classical value)
Xn.
For a QKD protocol as described above (where the dis-
tributed state is of the form of Eq. (1)), formula (2) can
be lower bounded by an expression which only involves
two-qubit systems. More precisely [6],
r ≥ sup
U←X
inf
σAB∈ΓQ
S(U |E)−H(U |Y ) , (3)
3where ΓQ is the set of all two-qubit states σAB (after the
filtering operation) which can result from a collective at-
tack [34] and which are compatible with the parameters
estimated by Alice and Bob (in particular, the QBER).
Here, S and H denote the von Neumann entropy and
its classical counterpart, the Shannon entropy, respec-
tively. Moreover, X and Y denote the classical outcomes
of measurements of σAB (on A and B, respectively) in
the computational basis, and E is any system that puri-
fies σAB. Similarly to the above formula, the supremum
runs over all mappings from X to U [35].
B. Local randomization
The local randomization step described above has first
been considered in [6, 7] and later been improved in [16].
In [17], the local randomization is nicely explained in the
context of entanglement purification.
To get an intuition why the local randomization can
help to increase the secret-key rate, it is useful to describe
the process as a quantum operation (as in [17]). Let σAB
be the state of a qubit pair held by Alice and Bob and
let |Ψ〉ABE be a purification of σAB . The state after
Alice randomly flips her bit value A with probability q,
can be described by |Ψ〉AA′BE =
√
1− q|Ψ〉ABE |0〉A′ +√
qσAx |Ψ〉ABE |1〉A′ , where A′ is an auxiliary system on
Alice’s side. The measurement of system A gives the raw
key. Note that |Ψ〉AA′BE results from the application
of a controlled-not operation on system AA′, where sys-
tem A′ is prepared in the state
√
1− q|0〉A′ + √q|1〉A′ .
The randomization of Alice thus entangles her system to
some auxiliary system (which is not under Eve’s control).
This, in turn, reduces the entanglement between Alice’s
relevant system (A) and Eve’s systems (monogamy of en-
tanglement), as Eve does not have a purification of the
state on the systems A and B, since now she only has the
purification of the state ρAA′B. Note that Bob’s informa-
tion on A is also reduces by the randomization process,
but—for certain values of the parameter q—he is less pe-
nalized than Eve. From this point of view, it can be
easily understood that the local randomization can help
to increase the secret-key rate.
C. Comparison to known bounds
For protocols based on qubit pairs, where the raw key
pair is obtained by orthogonal measurements of Alice and
Bob on some Bell-diagonal state σAB =
∑
i,j λijPΦij
(e.g., the BB84 or the six-state protocol), it follows
from (3) that the secret-key rate r (even without the
local randomization) is bounded by
r ≥ 1− S(σAB) ≥ 1− h(eb)− h(ep) .
Here, eb = λ10 + λ11 is the QBER and ep = λ01 + λ11
the phase error rate, i.e., the probability that Alice and
Bob get different bits when measuring in the z and the
x-basis, respectively. Because the QBER and the phase
error rate are not changed by applying at random σx
or σz , which make any state Bell diagonal, the bound
1−h(eb)−h(ep) holds for arbitrary states σAB. Note that
the above bound implies any of the lower bounds on the
one-way secret-key rate derived in previous works [8, 14].
D. Generalization of the lower bound
Because we assume above that Eve controls a system
that purifies the state ρAB held by Alice and Bob, the
bound (3) is fully determined by ρAB. However, this
assumption on Eve might overestimate her possibilities,
in which case the bound is not optimal. In the following
we drop this assumption to derive better lower bounds
on the secret-key rate.
Suppose that the state distributed in an entanglement-
based scheme is of the form PS((DAB ⊗ 1l)⊗n(ρ0ABE)),
where PS again denotes the map that randomly permutes
the order of the qubit pairs, DAB is some completely
positive map on two-qubit states, and ρ0ABE is some tri-
partite state. Then, it is an immediate consequence of
Lemma A.4 in [7] that the bound (3) on the secret-key
rate can be generalized to
r ≥ sup
U←X
inf
σ˜ABE∈Γ˜Q
S(U |E)−H(U |Y ) . (4)
Here, the infimum ranges over the set Γ˜Q of all states
σ˜ABE which can result from a collective attack and are
compatible with the parameters estimated by Alice and
Bob (e.g., the QBER).
We refer to Appendix C for an application of this result
to improve the analysis of the one-way SARG protocol
for single-photon pulses.
Consider now the general situation where the state de-
scribing Alice, Bob, and Eve’s system is the reduced den-
sity operator of a state |Ψ〉ABER =
∑
n αn|Ψn〉ABE |n〉R,
where {|n〉} forms an orthonormal basis of the Hilbert
space of an auxiliary system R, i.e., none of the three
parties has the auxiliary system at their disposal. Start-
ing from (4) and using the concavity of the entropy, we
find that the secret-key rate is bounded by
r ≥ sup
U←X
inf
σ˜ABE∈Γ˜Q
( ∞∑
n=0
|αn|2S(U |E, n)
)
−H(U |Y ), (5)
where S(U |E, n) = S(UE|n)− S(E|n), is the entropy of
U conditioned on E and the event that the measurement
of the auxiliary system R in the basis {|n〉} yields n.
One might also improve the bound using the following
observation which has also been used to derive the bound
given in Eq. (3). Let us consider the situation where
some auxiliary system is at Alice’ and/or Bob’s disposal,
but not at Eve’s (this could be for instance some addi-
tional qubits). Suppose that the state shared by ABE
and some auxiliary system R (which is not under Eve’s
4control) is given by |Ψ〉ABER =
∑
n αn|Ψn〉ABE |n〉R,
where {|n〉} is an orthonormal basis of HR, the
Hilbert space corresponding to system R. The state
|Ψ˜〉ABER =
∑
n αnU
AB
n |Ψn〉ABE |n〉R, with UABn uni-
tary operators diagonal in the z-basis leads to the
same measurement outcome for any measurement
by Alice and Bob in the computational basis as
|Ψ〉ABER, that is |k, l〉AB〈k, l|ρABE|k, l〉AB〈k, l| =
|k, l〉AB〈k, l|ρ˜ABE|k, l〉AB〈k, l|, where ρABE =
trR(P|Ψ〉ABER) and ρ˜ABE = trR(P|Ψ˜〉ABER). As-
suming that Eve has a purification of the state ρ˜AB
can only provide her with more power compared to the
situation where she has a purification of the state ρABR,
since this is equivalent to giving her the system R, which
she could simply measure, leading to the same result as
before (for details see also [6]). Thus, we can consider
the situation where Alice and Bob share the state ρ˜AB
and Eve has a purification of it. This can only increase
Eve’s power. We will use this observation in Appendix
B, in order to determine a good lower bound on the
secret-key rate for a QKD protocol using the so-called
XOR process.
III. QKD PROTOCOLS WITH TWO-WAY
POST-PROCESSING
In the following, we will consider QKD protocols
where, before the post-processing of the raw key as de-
scribed above, Alice and Bob additionally invoke a so-
called advantage-distillation subprotocol, which requires
two-way communication between Alice and Bob. The no-
tion of advantage distillation has first been investigated
in the context of classical key agreement [18] and later
been generalized to QKD [19, 20].
The advantage distillation protocol we consider here
has the following form: Alice publicly announces to Bob
the position of a block of m bits which have all the same
value (of course, she does not tell him which value). Then
Bob tells Alice whether for the given position, his corre-
sponding bits are all identical as well. If this is the case,
they both continue using the first bit of the block as a
new raw-key bit, otherwise they discard the whole block.
We emphasize here that our analysis below works for any
fixed value of the block size m (not only asymptotically
for large m). This is important for realistic protocols,
where m is usually small (e.g., m = 3).
To simplify the study of such protocols, we first show
that it suffices to analyze the action of the advantage dis-
tillation process on two-qubit Bell-diagonal states. More
precisely, Lemma 1 below implies that the state ρ¯n¯ ob-
tained by applying a block-wise operation E (for blocks
of size m) to a symmetric state ρn (see Eq. (1)) has vir-
tually the same statistics as if E was applied to a state
σ⊗m.
Lemma 1. Let ρn be a state on n particle pairs of the
form
ρn = PS(P⊗n1|Φ00〉 ⊗ P
⊗n2
|Φ01〉 ⊗ P
⊗n3
|Φ10〉 ⊗ P
⊗n4
|Φ11〉)
and let σ be a two-qubit Bell-diagonal state with eigen-
values n1n , . . . ,
n4
n . Moreover, let E be an operation which
maps Bell states of blocks ofm particle pairs to Bell states
of one single particle pair. Finally, let
ρ¯n¯ =
∑
n¯1,...,n¯4
µ¯n¯1,n¯2,n¯3,n¯4PS(P⊗n¯1|Φ00〉⊗P
⊗n¯2
|Φ01〉⊗P
⊗n¯3
|Φ10〉⊗P
⊗n¯4
|Φ11〉)
be the state describing n¯ = nm particle pairs defined by
ρ¯n¯ := E⊗n¯(ρn) and let λ¯1, . . . , λ¯4 be the eigenvalues of
σ¯ := E(σ⊗m). Then, for any ε ≥ 0,
∑
(n¯1,...,n¯4)∈Bε(λ¯1,...,λ¯4)
µ¯n¯1,n¯2,n¯3,n¯4 ≥ 1− 2−Θ(n¯ε
2)+O(log n),
where Bε(λ¯1, . . . , λ¯4) denotes the set of all tu-
ples (n¯1, . . . , n¯4) such that (
n¯1
n , . . . ,
n¯4
n ) is ε-close to
(λ¯1, . . . , λ¯4) and Θ(n¯ε
2) is asymptotically the same as
n¯ε2, up to a constant factor.
The lemma is a direct consequence of the exponential
quantum de Finetti Theorem [21]. It states that, for any
n-partite quantum state ρn which is invariant under per-
mutations of the subsystems, any part ρm = trn−m(ρn)
consisting of m subsystems is exponentially (in n − m)
close to a convex combination of states that virtually are
of the form σ⊗m. For completeness, we give a direct proof
of Lemma 1 (without referring to de Finetti’s theorem)
in Appendix A.
In order to analyze protocols with advantage distilla-
tion using Lemma 1, we use the following quantum me-
chanical description of the advantage distillation subpro-
tocol: Alice and Bob both apply the operation Xmad =
|0〉〈0, . . . , 0|+ |1〉〈1, . . . , 1| on m qubits. It is straightfor-
ward to check that
(X2ad)
⊗2(|Φi,j〉|Φk,l〉) = 1√
2
δi,k|Φi,j+l〉, (6)
where the sum j + l of indices is understood to be mod-
ulo 2. Hence, applying advantage distillation tom identi-
cal Bell-diagonal qubit-pairs with eigenvalues λ [36] leads
to a Bell-diagonal state with eigenvalues λ′ given by
λ′i,j =
1
T
[
(λi,0 + λi,1)
m + (−1)j(λi,0 − λi,1)m
]
(7)
where T = 2[(1 −Q)m + Qm] and where Q = λ10 + λ11
is the QBER before the advantage distillation. The
QBER Q′ after the advantage distillation is thus given
by Q′ = λ′10 + λ
′
11 =
Qm
(1−Q)m+Qm and (1 − Q)m + Qm
is the probability that the advantage distillation is suc-
cessful (i.e., Alice and Bob end up with a new raw key
bit). If Alice and Bob apply, after the advantage dis-
tillation the one-way classical post-processing described
above, the lower bound on the secret-key rate is given by
5Eq. (3), where the eigenvalues of σAB are given by the
λ‘s in (7) [37]. For instance for the six-state protocol one
obtains a positive key rate for any QBER < 0.276 (for
m −→ ∞). Note that for the six-state protocol it has
been shown that the tolerable QBER cannot be larger
than 0.276, if the first step in the post-processing is ad-
vantage distillation [22]. As mentioned before, the bound
on the secret-key rate is not only valid, for m −→∞, but
for any value of the block size on which advantage distil-
lation is applied.
In [20], Chau considered the secret-key rate obtained
when applying the above described advantage distillation
followed by the XOR transformation, where Alice and
Bob locally compute new raw key bits by taking the XOR
of a block of given bits. (For the sake of completeness we
demonstrate in Appendix B, how the XOR protocol can
be included in our analysis.) Both procedures were an-
alyzed in the asymptotic limit for infinitely large block
sizes. The result found there is that the six-state protocol
tolerates a QBER of up to 0.276. Surprisingly, the same
threshold for the QBER can be obtained, as shown above,
by a simpler protocol where the XOR transformation is
replaced by a local randomization on single bits on Alice’s
side. Moreover, the rate of this modified protocol is much
larger than that of Chau’s protocol, as local randomiza-
tion consumes less bits than the XOR transformation.
Note that, as shown recently by Bae and Acin [23], if one
omits the local randomization completely, the protocol
still tolerates a QBER of up to 0.276, but the secret-key
rate for large values of the QBER might be smaller.
IV. PROTOCOLS USING WEAK COHERENT
PULSES
A. Preliminaries
We now consider protocols where Alice does not send
single photons to Bob, but uses weak coherent pulses in-
stead. This scenario is practically motivated by the fact
that, with current technologies, it is difficult to create
single-photons pulses. In fact, many of today’s imple-
mentations of QKD rely on weak coherent pulses.
We start with a description of a prepare-and-measure
scheme and then translate it to an equivalent entangle-
ment based scheme, for which we will prove security.
In the prepare-and-measure scheme, Alice encodes the
bit values into phase randomized coherent states [38].
More precisely, she randomly chooses a basis j
and encodes the bit value k into the state ρkj =∑
n≥0 pn|φkj 〉〈φkj |⊗n, where |φkj 〉〈φkj |⊗0, denotes the vac-
uum for any value of j and k and pn = e
−µµn/n!, with µ
the mean photon number (for a Poissonian source [39]).
The description of Bob’s measurement depends on
the experimental setup. We focus on the situation
where Bob’s detectors do not distinguish between the
cases where they receive one or more than one pho-
tons, since with current technology, it is difficult to
count the number of photons. The POVM describ-
ing the photon detector is thus given by the opera-
tors {D†0D0, D†1D1}, with D0 =
∑
n≥0
√
pn.d.(n)P|n〉 and
D1 =
∑
n≥0
√
1− pn.d.(n)P|n〉, where pn.d.(n) is the
probability of not detecting any photon in case n pho-
tons arrived at the detector. This probability is given
by pn.d.(n) = (1 − pd)(1 − η)n, where pd is the proba-
bility of a dark count, and η is the detection efficiency,
i. e. overall transmission factor. The POVM element
D0 corresponds to the case where no photon is detected,
whereas D1 corresponds to the detection of one or more
photons. In the prepare-and-measure scheme Bob would
randomly choose a basis j and measure the arriving pho-
tons in that basis.
In the following, we consider the so-called untrusted-
device scenario, where it is assumed that Eve exchanges
Bob’s detectors with perfect ones (having perfect effi-
ciency and no dark counts) and introduces all errors her-
self [40]. Clearly, security under this assumption implies
security in a situation where Eve might not be able to
corrupt Bob’s detectors. Additionally, we assume that
Bob’s detector is constructed in such a way that, when-
ever a pulse consisting of more than one photon arrives,
then the detector output corresponds to the measurement
of one of the photons in the pulse chosen at random [41].
In the described scenario, we can without loss of gen-
erality assume that Eve only sends single photons to
Bob. This follows directly from the fact that the situ-
ation obtained by sending a multi-photon pulse is the
same as if Eve randomly selected one photon from the
pulse and sent this single photon to Bob. Bob’s measure-
ment can therefore simply be described by the operators
Bj = |0〉〈φ⊥1,j |+ |1〉〈φ⊥0,j | as defined previously.
Alice and Bob can estimate the following parame-
ters related to their raw key: (i) the total sifting rate
Rµ :=
∑
nRn, for Rn := pnYn where Yn is the probabil-
ity for Bob to find a conclusive result in case Alice sent n
photons; (ii) the average QBER Qµ =
∑
n
Rn
Rµ
Qn, where
Qn denotes the QBER for the pairs where Alice sent an
n-photon pulse. These two parameters will determine the
amount of key that can be extracted from the particular
raw key.
We use similar techniques as in [6, 7] to describe the
same protocol in the entanglement-based scheme. The
states prepared by Alice are
|Ψj〉ABR1 =
∑
n≥0
√
pn|Ψnj 〉AB|n〉R1 , (8)
where |Ψnj 〉AB = 1/
√
2(|0〉A|φ0j〉⊗nB + |1〉A|φ1j 〉⊗nB ). Here,
we have introduced an auxiliary system R1 containing
the photon number (which is neither controlled by Alice
nor Bob). If Alice measures her qubit in the computa-
tional basis and receives outcome k, the state Bob is left
with in the noiseless case (without interaction of Eve) is
ρB = 2trR1(P〈k|Ψj〉ABR1 ) =
∑
n≥0 pnP|φkj 〉⊗n , which cor-
responds to the coherent state (with randomized phase)
sent by Alice in the prepare-and measure scheme [42].
6The operation on Bob’s side is given by the operators
Bj , as described above.
The state describing the situation after Bob’s opera-
tion is given by
|χ〉ABER1R2 =
∑
j
BjUEB(|Ψj〉ABR1)|j〉R2 ,
where j corresponds to the basis chosen by Alice and
UEB is a unitary describing the attack of Eve. Note that
this state is not necessarily normalized, but its weight
tr(|χ〉〈χ|) corresponds to the sifting rate.
Restricted to Alice and Bob’s systems, |χ〉ABER1R2 is
a two-qubit state. We can thus apply the techniques pre-
sented in Section II to analyze the security of the proto-
col. More precisely, we need to evaluate the r.h.s. of (5)
to get a lower bound on the secret-key rate. First we do
not take the local randomization into account, i.e., we
choose U = X . The case including local randomization
will be treated in the next subsection. We thus obtain,
for the key rate
r ≥ inf
σ∈ΓRµ,Qµ
∞∑
n=0
RnS(X |E, n)−RµS(X |Y ). (9)
The set ΓRµ,Qµ contains all states which can result from
a collective attack by Eve and are compatible with the
average sifting rate Rµ and the QBER Qµ, as estimated
by Alice and Bob.
Because the (conditional) entropy of a classical variable
cannot be negative, the r.h.s. of (9) can be lower bounded
by restricting to any of the terms in the sum over n. Note
that, in (9), the average over n is only taken over the
term for the entropy conditioned on Eve’s system, but
not on the term for the entropy conditioned on Bob’s
system. This is because Eve might be able to measure
the photon number, whereas this is not the case for Bob.
B. Protocols with local randomization
So far we did not consider the possibility for Alice to
apply some local randomization on her classical bits. The
randomization can easily be included in the analysis: if
the randomization is acting on single bits, U ← X (bit
flip with probability q), (9) simply writes
r ≥ inf
σ∈ΓRµ,Qµ
∞∑
n=0
RnS(U |E, n)−RµS(U |Y ). (10)
Bob’s uncertainty is now given by S(U |Y ) = h(Qqµ),
where Qqµ = (1− q)Qµ + q(1−Qµ). Since Rµ =
∑
nRn,
(10) can also be written as
r ≥ inf
σ∈ΓRµ,Qµ
∞∑
n=0
Rn
[
S(U |E, n)− h(q)] (11)
−Rµ
[
h(Qqµ)− h(q)
]
.
Note that, for any n ≥ 0, the term S(U |E, n) on the
r.h.s. of this inequality can be bounded by S(U |E, n) ≥
S(U |X) = h(q) (since U is only computed from X), and
therefore the r.h.s. of (11) can again be lower bounded
by restricting the sum to any of its terms.
As we will see, the local randomization allows us to
get better lower bounds for the secret-key rate as well as
better lower bounds for the maximum distance for which
the rate is positive.
C. Examples: the BB84 and the SARG protocols
Using the results above, in particular (9), we now com-
pute the lower bound on the secret-key rate of the BB84
as well as the SARG protocols. In Section IVE we com-
pare the results we derive here with previous results, in
particular with the ones presented in [24] and [25].
In contrast to the single-photon case, where the lower
bound on the secret-key rate was a function of the QBER,
we are aiming here for a lower bound that depends on
the only two measurable quantities Rµ (the total sifting
rate) and Qµ (the total QBER). For simplicity, we will
in the following not explicitly include the local random-
ization, except in the final results (see Figures 1 and 2).
We remind the reader that, in order to include the local
randomization, (9) simply has to be replaced by (11).
Our computation of the bound given by (9) is subdi-
vided into two steps: First, for any n ≥ 0 and for any
Qn, we compute Sn(Qn) := infσn∈ΓQn S(X |E, n), where
ΓQn is the set of all states σn which can result from a
collective attack on a n-photon pulse causing a QBER of
Qn. In a second step, we compute the infimum
inf
{Rn,Qn}∈Γ˜Rµ,Qµ
∞∑
n=0
RnSn(Qn) (12)
where Γ˜Rµ,Qµ denotes the set of all parameters {Rn, Qn}
which are compatible with Rµ and Qµ. All the technical
details can be found in Appendix D.
1. BB84
For the BB84 protocol, it is easy to verify that for
any pulse consisting of n ≥ 2 photons, Eve has full
information on Alice’s measurement outcome X , i.e.,
infσn∈ΓQn S(X |E, n) = 0 ∀n ≥ 2. The lower bound is
thus given by [43]
r ≥ inf
{R1,Q1}∈Γ˜Rµ,Qµ
R1S
BB84
1 (Q1) −Rµh(Qµ) (13)
where SBB841 (Q1) := 1−h(Q1) (see Appendix D or [6, 7]).
As shown in Appendix D, the conditions in the
untrusted-device scenario for R1 and Q1 to be compatible
7with Rµ and Qµ are the following:
R1 ≤ 12p1
R1 ≥ Rµ − 12
∑
n≥2 pn
R1Q1 ≤ RµQµ.
(14)
Let Rmin1 = Rµ − 12
∑
n≥2 pn. If R
min
1 ≤ 0, then R1
can be set equal to zero, and the lower bound on r is
negative, i.e., Alice and Bob have to abort the protocol.
If Rmin1 > 0, let Q
max
1 = min(RµQµ/R
min
1 ,
1
2 ). Due to the
decreasing of SBB841 (Q1) for Q1 ≤ 1/2, we then get
r ≥ Rmin1 (1− h(Qmax1 )) −Rµh(Qµ). (15)
Note that this bound has first been derived in [27] using
a different technique. This bound can be interpreted as
follows: For an optimal attack, Eve should make R1 as
small as possible (i.e., block as many single-photon pulses
as possible) and, at the same time, make Q1 as large as
possible (i.e., introduce as many errors as possible on the
single-photon pulses that she forwards, which reduces her
uncertainty on Alice’s system as much as possible).
To get an idea of how good this bound is, we evaluate
the rate for the situation where there is no Eve present,
instead, the errors are introduced due to a realistic chan-
nel. The channel we consider is a lossy depolarizing chan-
nel with visibility V (or fidelity F = 1+V2 and disturbance
D = 1−V2 ), and a transmission factor t = 10
−αℓ
10 at dis-
tance ℓ (α is the attenuation coefficient). Furthermore,
we consider the situation where Bob’s detectors have an
efficiency ηdet and a probability of dark counts pd. An
explicit calculation (see Appendix D) shows that under
these assumptions, the rates that Alice and Bob would
get are
Rµ =
1
2
[
1− p¯ 2d e−µη
]
RµQµ =
1
4
[
1 + p¯de
−µFη − p¯de−µDη − p¯ 2d e−µη
]
,
where η = tηdet, p¯d = 1 − pd. When we insert these
values in (15) for experimentally reasonable values of α,
pd and ηdet, and optimize for different distances over the
mean photon number µ (which Alice is free to choose),
we get the results illustrated in Fig. 1 (for V = 1) and
Fig. 2 (for V = 0.95). We find that the optimal µ is
proportional to the transmission factor t, and our bound
on the secret-key rate is proportional to t2 (at least for
short distances, i.e., in the regime where dark counts are
not dominant); this was already observed in [26, 27].
2. SARG
Amajor difference between the SARG protocol and the
BB84 protocols is that Eve cannot get full information
on Alice’s value even if the pulse contains two photons.
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FIG. 1: Lower bound on the secret-key rate per pulse and
optimal µ for Poissonian sources as a function of the distance,
for the BB84 and SARG protocols, when Alice and Bob share
a quantum channel with perfect visibility V = 1. The other
experimental parameters are α = 0.25 dB/km, ηdet = 0.1 and
pd = 10
−5. The thick lines are the results we obtain when
Alice performs an optimal bit-wise local randomization; the
thin lines are the same, without randomization (q = 0).
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FIG. 2: Same plot as in Fig. 1 (top), but for a quantum
channel with non-perfect visibility, V = 0.95.
8In order to take this into account, we include the contri-
bution of the two-photon components in our formula for
the secret-key rate, i.e. we compute [44]:
r ≥ inf{R1,Q1,R2,Q2} R1SSARG1 (Q1) +R2SSARG2 (Q2)
−Rµh(Qµ). (16)
In Appendix D we describe how to compute SSARG1 (Q1)
and SSARG2 (Q2) (see also Appendix C and [25]), and we
derive the following conditions for R1, Q1, R2 and Q2 to
be compatible with Rµ and Qµ:
R1(1 −Q1) ≤ 14p1
R2(1 −Q2) ≤ 14p2
R1(1−Q1) +R2(1 −Q2) ≥ Rµ(1−Qµ)
− 14
∑
n≥3 pn
R1Q1 +R2Q2 ≤ RµQµ.
(17)
If Rµ(1 − Qµ) − 14
∑
n≥3 pn > 0, one can see in (16)
that Eve’s optimal choice is to set R1 and R2 as small as
possible, and Q1 and Q2 as large as possible (S
SARG
1 (Q1)
and SSARG1 (Q2) are decreasing): she should therefore set
the equality in the third constraint.
However, contrary to BB84, we have not been able
to give a simpler analytical expression for the infimum
in (16); we therefore resort to numerical computations.
Again, in order to estimate the previous bound in a
practical implementation of the protocol, we compute the
typical values of the parameters Rµ and Qµ when Alice
and Bob use a Poisson source and a lossy depolarizing
channel (see Appendix D):
Rµ =
1
2
[
1− p¯ 2d e−µη + p¯d2 e−µFη − p¯d2 e−µDη
]
RµQµ =
1
4
[
1− p¯ 2d e−µη + p¯de−µFη − p¯de−µDη
]
.
Similarly to the BB84 protocol, inserting these values
in Eq. (16), and optimizing for different distances over the
mean photon number µ, provides the results illustrated
in Figures 1 and 2.
For V = 1, we find an optimal µ proportional to t1/2,
and therefore our bound on the secret-key rate scales like
t3/2 (see also [31]), which is more efficient than for BB84
(where we had r ∝ t2). For V = 0.95 however, we find
that the SARG protocol is less efficient than the BB84,
and our lower bound for the secret-key rate of SARG also
scales like t2, the same as for BB84. However, it should
be noted that we determine here only lower bounds on
the rates.
D. Decoy states
The relevant set ΓRµ,Qµ in (9) over which the infimum
has to be taken to obtain the lower bound on the secret-
key rate is quite big, since Alice and Bob can only es-
timate the total sifting and total error rate. They do
neither have a good estimation of the error rates, Qn nor
of the corresponding yields, Yn. Hwang and Lo et. al.
pointed out a method to improve the lower bound on the
secret-key rate by making some additional measurements
([24, 28] see also [29]). The idea of the so-called decoy
states is to change the intensity of the pulses sent by Al-
ice in order to be able to estimate more quantities. This
allows them to deduce more information about the pos-
sible attack of an eavesdropper (like the estimate of the
QBER does). For practical purpose one assumes that Al-
ice is always sending weak coherent pulses, varying only
the mean photon number. We will show here how this
particular idea can be included in our analysis.
Let us first of all consider the case where Alice uses
two different intensities, i.e., one with mean photon num-
ber µ0 (we call it signal pulse in the following) and the
other (decoy pulse) with mean photon number µ1. Us-
ing more decoy states is a straightforward generaliza-
tion of this case. We describe the states sent by Alice
by |ψ〉ABR1R2 = |ψs〉ABR1 |0〉R2 + |ψc〉ABR1 |1〉R2 , where
|ψs〉ABR1 (|ψc〉ABR1) denotes the (unnormalized) signal
(decoy) pulse (see Eq. (8)). System R2 is again some
auxiliary system, introduced to keep track of the sig-
nal and decoy pulses. In this case this system is in Al-
ice’s hands, as she chooses the intensity of the signals.
Since Alice is going to measure the auxiliary system R2
in the computational basis, we can consider the state
σ = psσs⊗P|0〉R2 +(1−ps)σc⊗P|1〉R2 , where σs (σc) are
Alice and Bob’s signal (decoy) systems after Eve’s inter-
vention, respectively. Bob’s measurement is described in
the same way as before. Again, Alice and Bob can only
measure the total sifting rate Rµ =
∑
nRn =
∑
n pnYn
and estimate the total error rate Qµ =
∑
nRnQn/Rµ =∑
n pnYnQn/Rµ. However, now they are in the position
to obtain more information about their qubit pairs, as
they are capable of measuring these quantities for dif-
ferent values of µ (recall pn = e
−µµn/n!), i.e. they
can measure the values Rµ0 , Qµ0 and Rµ1 , Qµ1 . We can
again use (9) to compute a lower bound on the secret-
key rate. In this case, the infimum is taken over the set
Γ{Rµi ,Qµi}i of all Bell-diagonal two-qubit states of the
form psσs+pcσc, with σs (σc) denoting the Bell-diagonal
states corresponding to the signal (decoy) bits, which are
compatible with all estimated total sifting rates Rµi and
total error rates Qµi .
Let us now consider the case where Alice uses many
different intensities for her decoy states. Due to the defi-
nition of Rµ it is clear that, by varying µ, one can obtain
information about the quantities Yn. Knowing Yn and
{Qµ} one can then determine Qn. Note that in order
to determine Yn and Qn one needs infinitely many decoy
intensities; however, already a small number of such de-
coy intensities suffices to restrict the values of Yn and Qn
(see for instance [29]). The results of the analysis above
are illustrated in Fig. 3 and 4. In order to evaluate the
lower bounds we consider the situation where Alice and
Bob share a lossy depolarizing channel with visibilities
V = 1, V = 0.95 respectively.
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FIG. 3: Lower bound on the secret-key rate per pulse and op-
timal µ for Poissonian sources as a function of the distance,
for the BB84 and SARG protocols using decoy states, when
Alice and Bob share a quantum channel with perfect visibil-
ity V = 1. The other parameters are the same as in Fig. 1.
The thick lines are the results we obtain when Alice performs
an optimal bit-wise local randomization; the thin lines corre-
spond to the protocol without randomization (q = 0).
E. Related work
In [25], a similar comparison between the BB84 and
SARG protocols has been done, and lower bounds on the
secret-key rates were computed. For BB84, our results
are very similar to those of [25] (see also [24]), but we
could slightly increase the rates and the limiting distances
with using the local randomization process [45].
For the SARG protocol, taking into account the two-
photon contribution in the lower bound allows to increase
the lower bound. In the case of SARG without decoy
states, we could thus improve significantly the bound of
[25]. Our conclusion is therefore different: we find that
the SARG protocol performs better than BB84 for high
visibility V ≃ 1 (see Fig. 1). However, the SARG is more
sensitive to the loss of the channel, and for V = 0.95 for
instance, BB84 is more efficient (Fig. 2).
In the case of SARG with decoy states, the two-photon
contribution had already been taken into account in [25],
and we again get similar results. However, we could
slightly improve the rate with the improved calculation
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FIG. 4: Same plots as in Fig. 3, but for a quantum channel
with non-perfect visibility, V = 0.95.
of SSARG1 (Q1) (see Appendix C), and with the local ran-
domization process. Nevertheless, our conclusion is the
same as in [25], namely that when decoy states are used,
the SARG is outperformed by the BB84 protocol.
V. FURTHER APPLICATIONS, AND OPEN
PROBLEMS
There are still several possibilities to improve the lower
bounds on the secret-key rate of QKD protocols. One
way to look at this problem is to analyze the properties
of the set Γ over which one has to optimize in order to
obtain the lower bound (see e.g. Eq. (3)). Concerning
the single photon QKD protocols, one might try to find
the conditions on the encoding (and decoding) operations
which would lead to a properly restricted set ΓQ, such
that a high QBER can be tolerated.
In a protocol based on weak coherent pulses, it might
be advantageous to take the detected double clicks into
account. As mentioned above, this would (most likely)
impose further restrictions on the set of possible attacks
and thus result in an improvement of the secret-key rate.
In addition, it would be interesting to generalize the ideas
developed in this article to a scenario, where not only the
intensity of light is used but where also the coherence of
the light is checked (similar to the decoy states). One
protocol taking this into account has for instance been
proposed in [3]. Another possibility is to consider pro-
tocols based on weak coherent pulses that use two-way
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post-processing, as studied by Lo [30]. We also note here
that the techniques presented here can also be applied to
protocols based on squeezed states.
In this work, we considered the so-called untrusted-
device scenario, where the adversary might arbitrarily
modify the efficiency of Bob’s detector. If one consid-
ers the reasonable situation, where Eve cannot influence
Bob’s device, one might obtain larger values for the key
rate.
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APPENDIX A: PROOF OF LEMMA 1
In this appendix we prove the Lemma presented in
Section III. The operator σ⊗n is symmetric and can thus
be written as σ⊗n =
∑
n′
1
,...,n′
4
µn′
1
,n′
2
,n′
3
,n′
4
PS(P⊗n
′
1
|Φ00〉 ⊗
P
⊗n′2
|Φ01〉 ⊗ P
⊗n′3
|Φ10〉 ⊗ P
⊗n′4
|Φ11〉), for appropriate coefficients
µn′
1
,n′
2
,n′
3
,n′
4
. Hence, with the definition p := µn1,n2,n3,n4 ,
we have
σ⊗n = pρn + (1− p)ρ˜n
where ρ˜n is a symmetric quantum state on n subsystems.
Moreover, it is easy to see that the coefficient p cannot
be smaller than 1n .
By linearity, we get the following expression for the
state after the operation E⊗n¯ has been applied to σ⊗n:
σ¯⊗n¯ = E⊗n¯(σ⊗n) = pE⊗n¯(ρn) + (1− p)E⊗n¯(ρ˜n) . (A1)
Because σ¯⊗n¯is symmetric, it can be written as σ¯⊗n¯ =∑
n¯1,...,n¯4
µ¯′n¯1,n¯2,n¯3,n¯4PS(P⊗n¯1|Φ00〉⊗P
⊗n¯2
|Φ01〉⊗P
⊗n¯3
|Φ10〉⊗P
⊗n¯4
|Φ11〉),
for some coefficients µ¯′n¯1,n¯2,n¯3,n¯4 . Furthermore, by
the law of large numbers, the sum of the coefficients
µ¯′n¯1,n¯2,n¯3,n¯4 for tuples n¯1, n¯2, n¯3, n¯4 which are not con-
tained in Bε(λ¯1, . . . , λ¯4) is exponentially small, i.e.,
∑
(n¯1,...,n¯4)/∈Bε(λ¯1,...,λ¯4)
µ¯′n¯1,n¯2,n¯3,n¯4 ≤ 2−Θ(n¯ε
2) . (A2)
Finally, because of (A1),
µ¯′n¯1,n¯2,n¯3,n¯4 ≥ p · µ¯n¯1,n¯2,n¯3,n¯4 ,
where µ¯n¯1,n¯2,n¯3,n¯4 are the coefficients of ρ¯n. Since p ≥ 1n ,
µ¯n¯1,n¯2,n¯3,n¯4 ≤ n · µ¯′n¯1,n¯2,n¯3,n¯4 .
Combining this with (A2), we conclude
∑
(n¯1,...,n¯4)/∈Bε(λ¯1,...,λ¯4)
µ¯n¯1,n¯2,n¯3,n¯4 ≤ n2−Θ(n¯ε
2) .
APPENDIX B: ADVANTAGE DISTILLATION
USING THE XOR PROCESS
In this appendix we explain how the XOR process ap-
plied to many qubit pairs can be easily included within
this formalism. Alice selects randomly a set of bits and
informs Bob about this set. Then, Alice and Bob com-
pute both the XOR of those bits and keep only the result,
discarding all the others. Our goal is to find a simple de-
scription of the remaining logical bits, Eve’s system, and
the classical information sent form Alice to Bob (note
that Eve knows the randomly chosen set which is used
by Alice and Bob). We demonstrate here how this can
be achieved with the example of three qubit pairs. The
idea can be easily generalized to any number of pairs.
Quantum mechanically the XOR operation can
be described by a controlled-not operation, denoted
by Uc. Three copies of the state |Ψ〉ABE =∑
i,j
√
λi,j |Φi,j〉AB |Φi,j〉E transform, under the transfor-
mation Uc3→1A Uc
2→1
A ⊗ Uc3→1B Uc2→1B to the state
∑
i,j,k,l,m,n
√
λi,jλk,lλm,n|Φi+k+m,j〉A1B1 (B1)
|Φk,l+j〉A2B2 |Φm,n+j〉A3B3 |χi,j,k,l,m,n〉E ,
where |χi,j,k,l,m,n〉E = |Φi,j〉|Φk,l〉|Φm,n〉. Since Alice
and Bob are not going to use the systems 2 and 3
anymore, we want to consider a state that describes
only Alice’s and Bob’s first systems. More importantly,
we want to give Eve a purification of this state. If we
would assume that Eve has a purification of the state
describing systems A1 and B1, this would be equivalent
to assume that Eve has Alice’ and Bob’s second and
third pair after this transformation. It is evident that we
assume then that she has more power than she actually
has. In order to avoid to give her too much power we
use the idea mentioned in Section IID (see also [6]),
by considering the systems A2, B2, A3, B3 as auxiliary
system R [46]. For the unitary transformations, Uk,l,m,n
we choose Ui,j,k,l,m,n = σ
A1
z for l + j = n + j = 1 and
the identity otherwise. It can be easily verified that the
state describing Alice’s and Bob’s first system is then
the partial trace over E,R of the state |Ψ˜〉A1B1RE =∑
i,j,k,l,m,n
√
λijλklλmn|Φi+k+m,j+δl+j,1δn+j,1〉A1B1
|φj,k,l,m,n〉R|χi,j,k,l,m,n〉E , where |φj,k,l,m,n〉R denotes
the state |Φk,l+j〉A2B2 |Φm,n+j〉A3B3 . As explained
in Section IID, providing Eve with a purification
of the state that describe the systems A1, B1 never
underestimates her power. The eigenvalues of the
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two-qubit Bell-diagonal state describing Alice’s and
Bob’s remaining systems, denoted by λ˜i,j are
λ˜i,j = λ
2
i,j(λi,j + 3λi,j+1) + 3λ
2
i+1,j(λi,j + λi,j+1)(B2)
+ 6λi,jλi+1,jλi+1,j+1.
The intuition for this choice of unitary transformations
is the following. The state |Ψ〉ABE under consideration
is supposed to lead to a secret-bit. Thus, the coefficients
λi,j are such that it is very likely that if both, l + j = 1
and n + j = 1 then j = 1, which means that within
the remaining qubit-pair there is a phase-flip error. The
unitaries are chosen such that this error is corrected.
Using the new eigenvalues of the state describing Alice’
and Bob’s remaining bits, it is straightforward to com-
pute the lower bound on the secret-key rate (Eq. (3)).
APPENDIX C: AN IMPROVED ANALYSIS OF
THE SARG PROTOCOL WITH SINGLE
PHOTONS
In the SARG protocol the bit value 0 (1) is encoded
in the z-basis (x-basis) respectively. During the sifting
phase Alice announces a set containing two states, the
one which she sent and one in the other basis. There
are 4 different encoding and decoding operators. For in-
stance A1 = |0〉〈0z| + |1〉〈0x| and B1 = |0〉〈1x| + |1〉〈1z|
describe the situation where Alice sends on of the two
states {|0z〉, |0x〉} and tells Bob that the sent state is
within this set. Let us for the moment consider a sin-
gle qubit sent by Alice (for more details see [13]). The
state shared by Alice, Bob, and Eve after the sifting is
given by |χ〉ABER1 =
∑
j Aj ⊗ Bj |Ψ〉ABE |j〉R1 , where
|Ψ〉ABE is the state shared by Alice, Bob, and Eve af-
ter Eves intervention. Now, we apply some symmetriza-
tion to the state, which does not change any security
consideration, as explained in Section II. Let us con-
sider the state |χ˜〉ABER1R2 = |χ〉ABER1 |0〉R2 + σAz ⊗
σBz |χ〉ABER1 |1〉R2 . It is straightforward to show that the
reduced state describing Alice’ and Bob’s system is equal
to D˜2D1[D2(ρ0)], with ρ0 = trE(PΨ). Here, D˜2(ρ) =
1/2(ρ+ σz ⊗ σzρσz ⊗ σz), D1(ρ) =
∑
j Aj ⊗BjρA†j ⊗B†j
is given by the protocol and D2 denotes the depolariz-
ing map, i.e. D2(ρ) = 1/4(ρ+ σx ⊗ σxρσx ⊗ σx + σy ⊗
σyρσy ⊗ σy + σz ⊗ σzρσz ⊗ σz). Furthermore, the action
of D1 on a Bell-diagonal state is the same as A1 ⊗ B1
on that state. Thus, we only need to consider the situa-
tion where Eve has a purification of the state D2(ρ0),
i.e. the state before the action of D1 and D˜2. Us-
ing the results of [6, 7] this implies that the state we
have to use in order to compute the lower bound on the
secret-key rate is ρABE = D˜AB2 (PA1⊗B1|Φ〉ABE ), where
|Φ〉ABE =
√
λ00|Φ00〉AB|Φ00〉E +
√
λ01|Φ01〉AB|Φ01〉E +√
λ10|Φ10〉AB |Φ10〉E+
√
λ11|Φ11〉AB|Φ11〉E , i.e a purifica-
tion of the Bell-diagonal state D2(ρ0).
Using this description it is straightforward to com-
pute the state describing Alice’ and Bob’s system, which
is, in contrast to former considerations, no longer Bell-
diagonal. In the following we consider the situation where
Bob accepts only if the probability for him to obtain the
bit values 0 is the same as detecting 1. This is a first step
in the parameter estimation. Note that this condition
imposes λ01 = λ10. The QBER, Q, can be easily deter-
mined and one finds Q = (λ01 + λ11)/(1/2 + λ01 + λ11).
Using the normalization condition we find that the co-
efficients in the state |Φ〉ABE are given by: λ00 = 1 −
Q/(1 − Q) + λ11, λ01 = Q/(2(1 − Q)) − λ11, λ10 = λ01.
Thus, for a fixed QBER there is only one parameter,
λ11 ∈ [0, Q/(2(1 − Q))], over which one needs to min-
imize to obtain the lower bound on the secret-key rate
given in formula Eq. (4). Without the local randomiza-
tion one finds that the lower bound on the secret-key
rate is positive as long as Q ≤ 0.1167. Including the lo-
cal randomization allows to increase the tolerable QBER
to 0.1308 compared to the previously known bounds of
0.0968 without and 0.1095 with local randomization, re-
spectively [13].
APPENDIX D: CALCULATIONS RELATED TO
THE ANALYSIS OF PROTOCOLS BASED ON
COHERENT PULSES
This appendix contains some calculations related to
the evaluation of the lower bound (9) on the secret-key
rate for the BB84 and SARG protocols with weak coher-
ent pulses (see Section IV).
For this purpose, we first compute the infimum
Sn(Qn) := infσn∈ΓQn S(X |E, n) for any given Qn, and
then optimize (from Eve’s point of view) over the pa-
rameters Rn, Qn. These parameters must be compatible
with the measurable quantities Rµ, Qµ: in the case of
protocols which do not use decoy states, this leads to
particular constraints for each protocol, which we derive
here. (Note that for protocols with decoy states, Alice
and Bob can estimate all rates Rn, Qn: Eve can no longer
optimize over these parameters.)
Recall that we work in the untrusted device scenario,
where Eve has full control over Bob’s detectors. Dark
counts do not occur, and therefore R0 = 0, as Eve should
obviously not send any photon to Bob when she receives
an empty pulse from Alice. Moreover, we consider pro-
tocols where Bob treats all double clicks as if only one
randomly chosen detector clicked.
In a second step, in order to give estimations of our
bounds, we compute the typical values of the yields and
error rates if no adversary is present, i.e., if the channel
between Alice and Bob is a depolarizing channel with
fidelity F (or disturbance D = 1 − F ) and with a trans-
mission factor t. In addition, we suppose in that case that
Bob’s detectors have an efficiency ηdet and a probability
of dark counts pd. We will use the notations η = tηdet
for the overall transmission factor and p¯d = 1− pd.
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1. BB84 protocol
a. Eve’s uncertainty on the one-photon pulses
For BB84, the set ΓQ1 contains all states with diagonal
entries (in the Bell basis) λ00 = 1− 2Q1+λ11 and λ01 =
λ10 = Q1 − λ11, for any λ11 ∈ [0, Q1] [6, 7].
One can easily prove that S(X |E, n = 1) takes its min-
imum when λ1,1 = Q
2
1. Then, a straightforward calcu-
lation shows that SBB841 (Q1) = infσ1∈ΓQ1 S(X |E, n =
1) = 1 − h(Q1). Note that SBB841 (Q1) is decreasing for
0 ≤ Q1 ≤ 1/2: as expected, the higher the error Eve
introduces, the more she reduces her uncertainty.
b. Constraints on the yields and error rates
In the BB84 protocol, the probability that Alice and
Bob choose the same basis for their preparation and mea-
surement respectively is 1/2 (this is the sifting factor).
Therefore we have Yn ≤ 12 for all n, which implies the
following bounds:
R1 = p1Y1 ≤ 1
2
p1 (D1)
R1 = Rµ −
∑
n≥2
pnYn ≥ Rµ − 1
2
∑
n≥2
pn. (D2)
These are the first two constraints announced in (14).
The third constraint follows from the definition of Qµ,
RµQµ =
∑
nRnQn.
c. Yields and error rates for depolarizing channels
When implementing the BB84 protocol, Alice and Bob
would estimate the quantities Qµ, Rµ and then compute
the rate as explained above. In order to get an idea how
good the obtained bounds on the rate are we evaluate
here these quantities for the situation where there is no
Eve present and Alice and Bob share a lossy depolarizing
channel.
In BB84, when Alice sends n photons, the probability
that Bob chooses the same basis as Alice and gets a single
or a double click is :
Yn =
1
2
[
1− p¯ 2d (1− η)n
]
Bob gets a wrong bit if only the wrong detector clicks,
or if the two detectors click, but he randomly chooses a
wrong bit. This happens with probability :
YnQn =
1
2
∑n
k=0 C
k
nF
kDn−k
[
[p¯d(1− η)k][1− p¯d(1− η)n−k]
+ 12 [1− p¯d(1− η)k][1− p¯d(1− η)n−k]
]
= 14
[
1 + p¯d(1 − Fη)n − p¯d(1−Dη)n − p¯ 2d (1 − η)n
]
When Alice uses a Poissonian source (i.e. pn =
µn
n! e
−µ),
the overall yield and error rate are then
Rµ =
1
2
[
1− p¯ 2d e−µη
]
RµQµ =
1
4
[
1 + p¯de
−µFη − p¯de−µDη − p¯ 2d e−µη
]
.
2. SARG protocol
a. Eve’s uncertainty on the one-photon pulses
In order to compute Eve’s uncertainty on the one-
photon pulses, we use the method presented in Ap-
pendix C. We don’t have an analytical expression for
SSARG1 (Q1) = infσ1∈ΓQ1 S(X |E, n = 1), but we com-
pute it numerically. Note that we find SSARG1 (Q1) is
decreasing only for 0 ≤ Q1 . 0.338, and does not reach
zero.
b. Eve’s uncertainty on the two-photon pulses
We follow the calculations of [25] to compute Eve’s un-
certainty on the two-photon pulses. The set ΓQ2 contains
all states with the following diagonal entries (in the Bell
basis)
λ00 = 1−Q2 − λ01
λ10 = Q2 − λ11
λ01 + λ11 ≤ xQ2 + g(x), ∀x
(D3)
where g(x) = 16 (3− 2x+
√
6− 6√2x+ 4x2) [25]. When
minimizing xQ2 + g(x) over x, we get
λ00 = 1−Q2 − λ01
λ10 = Q2 − λ11
λ01 + λ11 ≤ B(Q2)
(D4)
where B(Q2) =
1
2 +
1
2
√
Q2(1− 3Q22 )−
√
2
4 (1− 3Q2).
One can show that for Q2 ≤ 16 , B(Q2) ≤ 12 and
the optimal choice of the parameters λij for Eve is
λ01 + λ11 = B(Q2) (i.e. Eve should make the phase
error as high as possible, up to 12 ), and λ11 = Q2B(Q2).
Then, a straightforward calculation gives SSARG2 (Q2) =
infσ2∈ΓQ2 S(X |E, n = 2) = 1 − h(B(Q2)). Note
that SSARG2 (Q2) is decreasing for 0 ≤ Q2 ≤ 16 , and
SSARG2 (
1
6 ) = 0.
c. Constraints on the yields and error rates
In the case of SARG, because of the non orthogonality
of the quantum states that are used to encode the clas-
sical bit values, it is a little bit more tricky to find the
constraints that the yields and error rates must satisfy.
Here, we will derive a constraint on the yields without
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errors (or probability that Bob gets a right conclusive
result), i.e., on pright = Yn(1 −Qn) (for any n ∈ N).
To this aim, let’s suppose in a first step that Alice sends
photons in the state |+z〉, that Eve attacks the pulse and
decides either to forward one photon to Bob in the state
ρB, or to block the pulse. In this case, Bob gets a right
conclusive result if (i) Alice announces the set {|+ z〉, |+
x〉} (which she does with probability 1/2), Bob chooses
to measure σx (probability 1/2) and (only) the detector
corresponding to | − x〉 clicks ; or (ii) Alice announces
the set {| + z〉, | − x〉}, Bob chooses to measure σx, and
the detector corresponding to | + x〉 clicks. Therefore,
Bob’s probability to get a right conclusive result when
Alice sends |+ z〉 is bounded by:
pright|+z ≤
1
4
〈−x|ρB| − x〉 + 1
4
〈+x|ρB |+ x〉 (D5)
≤ 1
4
Tr(ρB) =
1
4
. (D6)
This result actually does not depend on the state sent
by Alice, and we therefore have
pright = Yn(1−Qn) ≤ 1
4
. (D7)
The first three constraints announced in (17) then fol-
low :
R1(1−Q1) ≤ 1
4
p1 (D8)
R2(1−Q2) ≤ 1
4
p2 (D9)
R1(1−Q1) +R2(1−Q2) ≥ Rµ(1−Qµ)− (D10)
−1
4
∑
n≥3
pn (D11)
As before, the last constraint follows from the defini-
tion of Qµ.
d. Yields and error rates for depolarizing channels
As for the BB84–protocol, we evaluate here the lower
bound on the secret key rate for the situation where there
is no Eve present and Alice and Bob share a lossy depo-
larizing channel, in order to get an idea of how good the
obtained bounds on the rate are.
In order to calculate the yields and error rates for the
SARG protocol, let’s suppose that Alice sends n photons
in the state | + z〉, and announces {| + z〉, | + x〉}. By
symmetry, the following still holds for any state sent by
Alice, and any announcement. Similar calculations can
be found in [13].
If Bob measures σz , he gets a (wrong) conclusive click
on the detector corresponding to | − z〉, or a double click
with probabilities:
p|−z〉|z =
∑n
k=0C
k
nF
kDn−k[p¯d(1− η)k][1− p¯d(1− η)n−k]
= p¯d(1 − Fη)n − p¯ 2d (1 − η)n
p2clicks|z = 1− p¯d(1 − Fη)n − p¯d(1−Dη)n + p¯ 2d (1 − η)n
Similarly, if Bob now measures σx, he gets a (right)
conclusive click on the detector corresponding to | − x〉,
or a double click with probabilities:
p|−x〉|x = p¯d(1 − η2 )n − p¯ 2d (1 − η)n
p2clicks|x = 1− 2p¯d(1− η2 )n + p¯ 2d (1− η)n
Since Bob randomly chooses the basis he measures,
with equal probabilities, and since he randomly chooses
one outcome in the case of double clicks (conclusive or
not), then the probability that Bob’s result is conclu-
sive when Alice sends n photons is Yn =
1
2
(
p|−z〉|z +
1
2p2clicks|z
)
+ 12
(
p|−x〉|x + 12p2clicks|x
)
, and the error rate
on these pulses is YnQn =
1
2
(
p|−z〉|z + 12p2clicks|z
)
. We
find:
Yn =
1
2
[
1 + p¯d2 (1− Fη)n − p¯d2 (1−Dη)n − p¯ 2d (1− η)n
]
YnQn =
1
4
[
1 + p¯d(1− Fη)n − p¯d(1−Dη)n − p¯ 2d (1− η)n
]
For a Poissonian source, the overall yield and error rate
are then
Rµ =
1
2
[
1 + p¯d2 e
−µFη − p¯d2 e−µDη − p¯ 2d e−µη
]
RµQµ =
1
4
[
1 + p¯de
−µFη − p¯de−µDη − p¯ 2d e−µη
]
.
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